



"[F]orget it. Don't even think about getting justice in a Russian court."'
This assessment of Russian justice, offered by a Western mutual fund manager,
is widely shared.2 It is, in part, a legacy of the Soviet era, when the phrase
"telephone justice" was coined to describe the practice by which Communist
Party officials would contact judges and instruct them how to rule in particular
cases. Courts and lawyers were held in low esteem.3 A Russian proverb cautions:
"Don't be afraid of the law, be afraid of the judge." 4
These perceptions are compounded by the Wild East image of post-Soviet
Russia. In a recent California case, the plaintiff, an American company, urged
the court to accept jurisdiction over a Russian defendant on the ground that its
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in this issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
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1. Mark Mobius, quoted in Elif Kaban, Shares, Guns, and Bodyguards in Russia's Courts,
Reuters Newswire, May 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File. Mr. Mobius
manages several emerging market funds, including the Templeton Russia Fund.
2. See, e.g., Michael Binyon, Murmansk Corruption and Red Tape Put Nordic Business Links
at Risk, LONDON TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7704524 (asserting, in connection
with a Norwegian party's ouster from a joint venture, that "[r]esort to the courts was impossible:
there is virtually no enforceable contract law in Russia").
3. See, e.g., George Ginsbergs, The Soviet Judicial Elite: Is It?, 11 REV. SOCIALIST L. 293
(1985).
4. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Russia's Amateur Justice, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1996).
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representatives "would be killed if they attempted to litigate this case in Russia.'
Western observers also express concerns that Russian judges lack expertise in
commercial matters and are susceptible to influence by bribery, physical intimida-
tion, and xenophobia.6 A U.S. congressional committee heard testimony in 1996
that:
Soviet-era judges lack the training and legal knowledge to protect property rights and
to adjudicate disputes between private citizens. Moreover, many of these judges are
corrupt. (For example, in one town I heard of a sitting judge who was paid a monthly
salary by a local law firm to settle cases in favor of that firm's clients).7
It is not surprising, therefore, that many Western companies doing business in
Russia "will do everything possible" to avoid the Russian courts.'
Yet, whether they like it or not, foreign companies are increasingly finding
themselves in Russian courts and arbitral tribunals, 9 as in the following situations:
* A Scandinavian company obtains an arbitration award in London against a
Russian company and seeks to have it recognized by a Russian court.' °
* An American partner in a joint venture does not receive its share of the
venture's profits. The joint venture agreement provides for arbitration by
a Moscow-based arbitration tribunal."
" A Finnish construction firm performing work in Russia is assessed Russian
social insurance/payroll taxes. The firm files suit in Russian court to chal-
lenge the assessment based upon the provisions of a tax treaty between the
USSR and Finland.'
2
* Western investors holding 40 percent of the stock of one of Russia's largest
steel manufacturing enterprises are denied the opportunity to nominate candi-
5. Happy Merchant Ltd. v. Far Eastern Shipping Co., No. C-94-3927, 1995 WL 705131, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1995). The court expressed sympathy for the plaintiff, observing that it "may
be correct in its assertion that Russia ... [is] unwilling or unable to protect plaintiff's legal rights,"
but nevertheless declined jurisdiction. Id.
6. See, e.g., Simon Zinger, Comment, Navigating the Russian Shipping Industry: Making the
Most of International and Russian Law for Successful Arbitration Against Russian Parties, 8 U.S.F.
MAR. L.J. 141, 172 (1995).
7. Rise of Int'l Organized Crime, Testimony before the House Int'l. Affairs Comm. by Ariel
Cohen Ph.D., Jan. 31, 1996. available in 1996 WLF135369 (Jan. 1996) available in 1996 WL.
8. Jim Vail, Arbitration Courts Grow Slowly, Moscow TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (quoting an unidentified Western lawyer).
9. Western Law Firms Are Litigating More in Russian Courts, 8 Russ. & COMMONWEALTH
Bus. L. REP., July 30, 1997, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rcblr File.
10. Decision of Jan. 23, 1992 (Frontline v. ExportKhleb), Moscow City Court, translated in
Y.B. COMM. ARB. at 710 (vol. XIX 1994).
11. Myrick Int'l. v. Ammyinter, Contitrade AG, Ammophos, ICAC Case No. 286/1995 (Apr.
12, 1995). See discussion infra Part III.
12. See Informatsionnoe Pis'mo Presidiuma VAC RF, Obzor praktiki rassmotreniia sporov po
delam s uchastiem inostrannykh lits [Informational Letter of Presidium of the Supreme Arbitrazh
Court of the RF, Review: Practice in Examination of Disputes Regarding Matters with the Participation
of Foreign Persons], issued Dec. 25, 1996, reprinted in KHOZIASTVO I PRAvo [hereinafter KHOZ.
I PRAVO], April 1997, 95, 107.
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dates for the board of directors. They bring an action in the regional court
for Lipetsk, located over 200 miles south of Moscow. 3
Western parties are experiencing surprising success in such actions. Notwith-
standing the acute problems afflicting the Russian legal system, to simply write
off Russian courts and arbitral tribunals as avenues for enforcement of legal and
contract rights is a mistake.
This article focuses on the types of litigation most likely to involve foreign
companies doing business in Russia, including:
(i) recognition of foreign arbitral awards in Russian courts;
(ii) arbitration in the Moscow-based International Commercial Arbitration
Court; and
(iii) litigation in the Russian commercial courts (known as arbitrazh courts).
I. Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards
The USSR ratified the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly referred to as the "New
York Convention," in 1960. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian
Federation (RF) agreed to fulfill the USSR's international treaty obligations,
including those under the New York Convention.
During the Soviet era, all foreign trade was controlled by the state, and arbitration
awards against Soviet parties were invariably honored. Thus, the issue of whether
a Soviet court would recognize a foreign arbitral award was never tested. 
4
With the breakup of the USSR, foreign trade became decentralized and volun-
tary compliance with arbitral awards by Russian entities was no longer assumed. ' 5
Indeed, many Russian entities refused to comply with arbitral awards. '
6
There was speculation among international lawyers regarding whether Russian
courts would actually recognize a foreign arbitral award.' 7 The first concrete
affirmation came in January 1992, when a Moscow city court ordered enforcement
of an award issued by an arbitration tribunal in London against a former Soviet
foreign trade organization.' 8 In doing so, the court brushed aside the defendant's
13. John Thornhill, Russian Court Backs Investors, FIN. TIMES (London), May 22, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 11029544.
14. Kaj Hober, Arbitration in Moscow, 3 ARB. INT'L 120, 152 (1987).
15. Russia's Failure to Pay Western Firms Leads to Increased Use of Arbitration, 3 BNA E.
EUR. REP., Mar. 29, 1993, at 243.
16. Company Case Study: Norwegians Get Their Money Back, Bus. E. EUR., Aug. 23, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Abi File; Marina Shpagina, Vladimir Rudenko & Mikhail
Solovyov, Foreign Creditors: Only Live Debtor Is Good Debtor, BIZEKON NEWS, July 12, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Sbe File.
17. See, e.g., Volker Viechtbauer, Arbitration in Russia, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 355, 429-430
(1993). Skepticism on this point still abounds. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice:
The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1965 (1996) (asserting that
"arbitral awards face little likelihood of successful enforcement if rendered against a Russian party").
18. Frontline, supra note 10.
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argument that the New York Convention was not applicable because it was ratified
by the USSR and not the RF.' 9
A succession of other Moscow city court decisions recognizing foreign arbitral
awards quickly followed, including court orders in October 199220 and February
1993 upholding awards by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce 2' in favor of Scandinavian and Swiss companies, respectively. The
latter decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of the RF, which affirmed
the lower court's enforcement order.22
Foreign legal observers drew additional comfort from the RF's enactment on
July 7, 1993, of an international commercial arbitration statute based on the
model arbitration act of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL).23 The law provides that "an ... award, irrespective of the
country in which it was made, shall be recognized as binding and, upon application
in writing to the competent court, shall be enforced," 24 subject to the following
limited exceptions, which track those set forth in the New York Convention:
(i) one of the parties to the arbitration agreement was incompetent, or the
agreement is invalid according to the governing law of the agreement or
the law of the RF;
(ii) one of the parties was not properly notified of the arbitration hearing or,
for other reasons, could not present its case in the arbitration;
(iii) the award resolves issues over which the arbitrator(s) had no jurisdiction
under the arbitration agreement; or
(iv) the panel of arbitrators or procedures were not in accordance with the
arbitration agreement.25
In addition, enforcement may be refused if it would be contrary to RF public policy
or if the subject matter of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under RF law. 26
In theory, the foregoing exceptions, particularly the public policy exception,
might appear to offer a Russian court considerable leeway in refusing to recognize
19. Id.
20. Decision of Oct. 12, 1992, Moscow City Court, translated in Y.B CoM. ARB. 666 (vol.
XXI 1996).
21. For Western parties, Stockholm has been the venue of choice for East-West arbitrations
since at least 1977, when the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the USSR Chamber of
Commerce and Industry agreed upon a model arbitration clause providing for arbitration of US-Soviet
trade disputes in Sweden. In March 1993 the AAA and the RF Chamber of Commerce and Industry
signed a new Optional Clause Agreement, which also provides for arbitration in Sweden. The recom-
mended arbitration clause is reproduced in 3 WORLD ARB. REP. 3313 (1993). For an insightful
discussion of the Stockholm Chamber's Arbitration Institute, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth,
DEALING IN VIRTUE 182-196 (1996).
22. Decision of April 28, 1993 (No. 8-3g 93-17), Supreme Court of the RF, translated in Y.B.
COM. ARB. 668 (Vol. XXI 1996).
23. Zakon o mezhdunarodnom kommercheskom arbitrazhe [Law on International Commercial
Arbitration], Vedomosti Fed. Sobr. RF, 1993, No. 32, Item No. 1240 [hereinafter Int'l Arb. Law].
24. Id. art. 35.
25. Id. art. 36(1).
26. Id. art. 36(2).
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an award. As observed by one commentator: "A Russian court, especially at
the local level, may be unwilling to subject a Russian party to fines which result
in insolvency and may define public policy to shield the Russian party from
paying a foreign award." 27
Yet, most countries that have ratified the New York Convention read the public
policy exception narrowly. 28 It is unclear whether Russian courts will follow a
similar approach. One encouraging sign, however, is that since the enactment
of the July 1993 law, Russian courts continue to recognize international arbitral
awards in favor of foreign parties. 29 By one assessment in early 1996, "[a]t least
forty foreign arbitration awards ha[d] been successfully submitted to Russian
courts for enforcement." 30 Indeed, with one exception (the Myrick International
case, discussed below), it does not appear that a Russian court has ever refused
to recognize an arbitral award in favor of a foreign party. 3'
II. The International Commercial Arbitration Court
In negotiating arbitration provisions with Russian parties, Western firms gener-
ally seek to designate a third country as the arbitral forum.32 Russian parties, on
the other hand, are becoming increasingly insistent upon designating the Moscow-
based International Commercial Arbitration Court (ICAC), which is attached to
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the RF.33 This insistence is driven,
27. Zinger, supra note 6, at 171. Such concerns are not unique to Russia. See, e.g., Kristin T.
Roy, The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defense
to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 920, 954 (1993).
28. See generally Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing the
Award Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 867, 880 (1996). Courts in the
United States have taken the position that the "public policy limitation on the Convention is to be
construed narrowly [and] to be applied only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most
basic notions of morality and justice." Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1975).
29. See C.M. Kudriiashov, Institutsionnyi arbitrazh v Stokgolme [Institutional Arbitration in
Stockholm], 3 MOSKOVSKII ZHURNAL MEZJDUNARODNOVO PRAVO 101, 109 (1995) (discussing a
December 10, 1993, Moscow City Court ruling enforcing an award issued by the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce); Olin Wethington & Peter Lichtenbaum, Does the Bear Dance to the Arbitrator's
Tune?Russian Courts' Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards, 4 E./W. EXEC. GUIDE, at 3-4 (1994)
(discussing a March 28, 1994, Moscow City Court decision enforcing a Stockholm Chamber award).
30. W.E. Butler, Techniques of Law Reform in the CIS, I SUDEBNIK 9, 29 n. 11 (1996).
31. See Kaj Hober, Enforcing Foreign ArbitralAwards in Russia, 6 Russ. & COMMONWEALTH
Bus. L. REP., 1, 9 (1995); Wethington & Lichtenbaum, supra note 29, at 4.
32. For a discussion of arbitral fora catering to Russia-related disputes, see Glenn P. Hendrix,
Finland as an Alternative Arbitration Forum, 6 Russ. & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., I (June
22, 1995).
33. In addition to the ICAC, there are numerous arbitral bodies in Russia attached to commodity
and stock exchanges, city chambers of commerce, and trade associations (such as the Association
of Russian Banks). These bodies are oriented toward arbitrating disputes between wholly Russian
entities, however, and are beyond the scope of this article. There is also a Maritime Arbitration
Commission attached to the RF Chamber, with a history dating back to 1930. An international
commercial arbitration court was recently formed in St. Petersburg. See Eric Schwartz, LocalArbitra-
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in part, by the expense of arbitrating in the major Western European arbitral
institutions.34
The number of cases filed annually with the ICAC mushroomed from less
than 100 in 1990 to approximately 500 in 1992, and has stayed at roughly that
level since then. 35 The ICAC handles more disputes involving Russian parties
than any competing arbitral institution, including the Stockholm Chamber, which
reportedly conducts 50 to 100 Russia-related arbitrations per year.36
American companies are arbitrating before the ICAC with increasing frequency,
with five U.S. companies involved in cases in 1993 (three as claimants and two
as respondents, with a total of $8 million in dispute); eighteen in 1994 (fifteen as
claimants and three as respondents, with a total of $100 million in dispute); 37 and
thirty-four in 1995 (two as claimants and thirty-two as respondents, with approxi-
mately $115 million in dispute). Through the first ten months of 1996, there were
thirty-four cases filed in which U.S. companies were involved (nine as claimants
and twenty-five as respondents, with approximately $31 million in dispute).38
The ICAC is the successor to the Moscow-based Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission (FTAC), which was founded in 1932 in connection with the Soviet
Union's effort to boost its image as a reliable trading partner. Consistent with
that goal, the FTAC sought to avoid decisions that might be perceived in the
international arena as politically motivated, 39 and secured grudging respect from
Western jurists as a generally unbiased tribunal.40
The ICAC itself is also widely recognized for impartial decision making. In
tion Court Coming To Life, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Russia) (May 24, 1997) <http://www.spb.su/
times/current/local-arb.html >. It is too early to determine whether the St. Petersburg court will be
a serious rival to the ICAC.
34. Russia's Failure to Pay Western Firms, supra note 15, at 244; Olga Zimenkova & Alla
Kazakina, New Rules Prompt Rethinking: Is It Time to Arbitrate in Russia?, 6 SEEL 1, 5 (1995).
35. I. Zikin, Spory s uchastiem predpriatii s inostrannymi investitsiami v praktike Mezhdunarod-
novo kommercheskovo arbitrazhnovo suda pri TPP RF [Disputes Involving Foreign Investors in the
Practice of the CCI International Commercial Arbitration Court], KHOZ. I PRAVO, May 1995, at 99.
36. Rachel Katz, Petersburg to Get Home Court, Moscow TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at 3.
37. U.S. Embassy (Moscow), Commercial Dispute Settlement in Russia and the Role of the
International Commercial Arbitration Court, Feb. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library.
38. Letter from Alexander Komarov, President, ICAC, to Glenn P. Hendrix (Oct. 31, 1996).
39. See Susan E. Samuels, Note, The Soviet Position on International Arbitration: A Wealth of
Choices or Choices for the Wealthy, 26 VA. J. INT'L. L. 417,432 (1986). The FTAC's most notorious
misstep was the decision in Jordan Investments, Ltd. v. Soiuznefteksport (Israel v. USSR), award
of June 19, 1958, reprinted in Martin Domke, The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration, 53 AM. J. INT'L
L. 787, 800 (1959). See Harold J. Berman, Force Majeure and the Denial of an Export License
Under Soviet Law: A Comment on Jordan Investments Ltd. v. Soiuznefteksport, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1128, 1144 (1960).
40. See, e.g., Thomas M. Bell, Note, Resolution of International Trade Disputes: An Analysis
of the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission 's Decisions Concerning the Doctrine of Force
Majeure as an Excuse to the Performance of Private International Trade Agreements, 10 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 135 (1986); Harold J. Berman & George L. Bustin, The Soviet System of Foreign
Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 987, 1019-26 (1975). But see Pat K. Chew, A Procedural and
Substantive Analysis of the Fairness of Chinese and Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitrations, 21 TEX. INT'L
L. J. 291 (1986).
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compelling an American party to comply with an agreement to arbitrate before
the ICAC, a U.S. district court recently observed that "there is no reason to
believe that the Chamber of Commerce in Moscow cannot provide fair and impar-
tial justice to these litigants." 4
The ICAC's jurisdiction extends beyond matters which would ordinarily be
considered "international," and is specifically defined to include "disputes aris-
ing between enterprises with foreign investments and international associations,
and organizations, set up in the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as
disputes between their participants, and also disputes between them and other
subjects of the law of the Russian Federation.' 42 Thus, a dispute between two
Russian legal entities, one of which has foreign investors, can be arbitrated before
the ICAC even if the dispute pertains solely to matters occurring within Russia.43
In that regard, the ICAC offers an alternative Russian forum to foreign parties
wishing to avoid the Russian court system.
The ICAC's fees compare favorably to those of the major European arbitral
institutions. The effective rate of the fee declines with the size of the claim. For
a claim valued at $1 million, for instance, the fee would be $16,240. For claims
above $10 million, the fee equals $39,440 plus 0.1 percent of the portion of the
claim over $10 million." The arbitration fee not only remunerates the ICAC,
but also covers the arbitrators' and reporter's fees. 45 The fee is reduced by 30
percent if the case is considered by a single arbitrator.46
Effective May 1, 1995, the ICAC amended its rules of procedure to address
certain long-standing concerns of foreign legal observers. 47 The rules are based
41. Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal
dismissed, 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
42. Rules of the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the RF Chamber of Commerce
and Industry [hereinafter ICAC Rules], art. I, § 1, 2. An English translation of the ICAC rules
and arbitrator list may be obtained at the following address: 6 Ilyinka Street, Moscow 103012, RF,
Facsimile number: 7 095 929 03 34.
43. The breadth of the ICAC's jurisdiction tracks the broad scope of the RF International Arbitra-
tion Law. See Int'l Arb. Law, supra note 23, art. 1, § 2. The President of the ICAC, Alexander
S. Komarov, notes that both the RF International Arbitration Law and the ICAC Rules cover certain
"disputes which can be regarded as 'internal' rather than of an international nature." Alexander S.
Komarov, Russian Federation Legislation on International Commercial Arbitration, ICC INT'L CT.
COMM. ARB. BULL. 117 (1994).
44. ICAC Rules (Fee Schedule Appendix), § 3.
45. Id. To put the ICAC's fees in perspective, the Stockholm Arbitration Institute's fee for the
administration of a $1 million claim would be approximately $7700 (at December 1996 exchange
rates); however, that amount is exclusive of the compensation paid to the arbitrators themselves.
See Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce app. § 1. The Stockholm
Arbitration Institute's fee, together with the arbitrators' fees, will probably exceed the ICAC fee in
most cases.
46. ICAC Rules (Fee Schedule Appendix), § 4.
47. For an article by the President of the ICAC discussing the new rules, see Alexander S.
Komarov, International Commercial Arbitration in Russia as a Means of Resolving International
Economic Disputes, 22 REV. CENTRAL & E. EUR. L. 19 (1996). An ICAC arbitrator, Professor
Olga Zimenkova, has also co-authored an article in English on the new rules. See Zimenkova &
Kazakina, supra note 34.
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largely upon the UNCITRAL model rules and allow flexibility with respect to
choice-of-law,48 the language49 and the location ° of the hearing, and other issues.
The most important change effected by the new rules concerns the pool of
available arbitrators. Prior to May 1, 1995, parties were restricted to selecting
arbitrators from a list maintained by the court. All of the arbitrators on the FTAC's
list were Soviet. Likewise, until recently, all of those on the ICAC's list were
Russian. 5' This led many observers to question the court's ability to render impar-
tial decisions.52
The new rules allow parties to select arbitrators (including non-Russians) who
are not on the ICAC's list, although that right is subject to certain limitations.
For instance, if the parties' agreement provides for the arbitration to be conducted
by a panel of three or more arbitrators, the president of the panel must be selected
from the list. 53 The ICAC also makes an appointment from the list if the agreement
provides for a single arbitrator and the parties fail to select a mutually acceptable
candidate.5 4 Moreover, the list itself was recently expanded to include non-
Russians. As of October 1996, seventeen nationalities (including at least two
Americans) were represented on the list.
These changes confirm the ICAC's emergence as a credible arbitral institution.
The ICAC deserves a look from Western companies seeking a forum for the
resolution of Russia-related disputes.
III. The Myrick International Case
It is generally assumed that one advantage of ICAC arbitration is the greater
ease of enforcing an award in the Russian courts. 55 Nevertheless, to the author's
knowledge, the only instance in which a Russian court refused to enforce an
arbitral award in favor of a foreign party involved a ruling by the ICAC (although
the court's refusal to enforce the award was overturned on appeal). That case
serves as an interesting case study of the use of Russian legal institutions to
enforce contract rights.
The case involved a dispute between a U.S. company (Myrick International
Ltd., or MIL), its Russian joint venture partner (Ammophos), and the venture
48. ICAC Rules, § 13. See also Int'l Arb. Law, art. 28.
49. ICAC Rules, § 10. Over half of the 109 arbitrators on the ICAC's arbitrator list report they
speak English.
50. Id. at § 7.
51. Viechtbauer, supra note 17, at 370.
52. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. BUTLER, ARBITRATION IN THE SOVIET UNION 13 (1989); Alan Koman,
Arbitrating Among the Russians? Sixteen Issues a Western Party Must Consider, 42 FEDERAL LAWYER
26, 28 (1995).
53. ICAC Rules, § 2.3.
54. Id. at § 21.
55. Such awards were, in fact, enforced by Russian courts in several instances. See, e.g., Com-
pany Case Study, supra note 16.
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entity itself (Ammyinter).56 The venture operated a fertilizer production plant in
Cherepovets, a city of 320,000 located 250 miles north of Moscow. MIL was
denied its share of the venture's 1991 profits and initiated arbitration proceedings
with the ICAC in August 1993.
The arbitration panel was comprised of three Russians (two law professors
and one practicing lawyer). Ammyinter presented a colorable argument in defense
of withholding the dividend, contending that MIL had failed to make its capital
contribution (primarily consisting of equipment) to the venture prior to December
31, 1991, as required by the joint venture agreement. As a result, the venture
lost Russian tax benefits for 1991 that were available to entities with greater than
30 percent foreign investment. Nevertheless, the ICAC panel rejected Ammyin-
ter's contentions (and implicitly disagreed with the findings of the Russian tax
authorities), holding that the contribution of equipment was effective when the
equipment was shipped from the United States (in 1991), not when it was released
from customs in Russia (in 1992).
ICAC rules provide that an award shall be rendered "if possible" within 180
days of the appointment of the arbitrator(s).57 Even so, the proceedings in the
MIL case were somewhat prolonged, partly because the panel postponed a ruling
pending the Tax Inspectorate's final determination regarding Ammyinter's tax
liability, and also because Ammyinter delayed producing financial records re-
quested by the panel." The ICAC award was issued in April 1995, eighteen
months after the proceeding commenced.
The Russian party refused to comply with the ICAC award, and MIL sought
to have it enforced in the court of general jurisdiction in Cherepovets.5 9 The
court, without referring to the New York Convention or the RF International
Arbitration Law, refused to enforce the award. Both MIL and its Russian lawyer
attribute the court's refusal to enforce the award to Ammophos' influence in
Cherepovets. Ammophos is one of Cherepovets' largest employers and its general
director was, at the time, a deputy in the Russian parliament.
MIL appealed to the regional appellate court in the nearby city of Vologda.
In August 1996 that court ordered the Cherepovets court to issue a writ of execu-
56. This discussion of the MIL case is based upon the ICAC decision; see Myrick International
Ltd. v. Ammyinter, Contitrade AG, Ammophos, ICAC Case No. 286/1995 (Apr. 12, 1995), and
a series of telephone interviews in October and December 1996 with John Myrick (MIL's sole
shareholder) and MIL's counsel, Alexander Pipia.
57. ICAC Rules, § 11.
58. Pursuant to the RF International Arbitration Law, art. 25, in the event a party fails to produce
requested documentary evidence, the panel has discretion to either continue the hearing or to make
an award based on evidence before it.
59. An action to enforce an international arbitral award must be filed at the debtor's residence.
See Ukaz prezidiuma Verkhovnovo Sovieta SSSR, 0 priznanii i ispolnenii v SSSR reshenii inostran-
nykh sudov i arbitrazhei [Decree on Recognition and Execution of Decisions of Foreign Courts and
Arbitration Tribunals in the USSR], Vedomosti SSSR, 1988, No. 26, Item No. 427, 2 [hereinafter
1988 Arbitration Decree], translated in BUTLER, supra note 52.
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tion. As of this article's completion, however, MIL had yet to collect any money.
During the three years in which the case was pending, the venture's assets were
siphoned to other entities.
The MIL case illustrates many of the difficulties of arbitrating or litigating
disputes in Russia, particularly those involved in collecting a monetary award. 60
The case also demonstrates that not all Russian courts will necessarily be as
accommodating as the Moscow city courts in enforcing arbitral awards in favor
of non-Russian parties. Nevertheless, MIL's victory before the ICAC, and the
Vologda court's recognition of the award, also shows the possibility for a foreign
party to vindicate its rights in Russian legal institutions.
IV. The Arbitrazh Courts
Given a choice between arbitration and litigation in a Russian court, arbitration
is the preferred alternative in most cases. In certain situations, however, arbitra-
tion may not be possible. Unless the parties to a dispute agree to arbitrate, or
previously provided for arbitration in a contract between them, an arbitration
tribunal does not have jurisdiction. In addition, certain disputes are simply not
arbitrable, including, for instance, disputes with government authorities, such
as tax officials. In other instances, a party may require relief that an arbitral
body cannot provide, such as a preliminary injunction or attachment of property.
A. JURISDICTION OVER COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Russia has a system of specialized commercial courts, known as arbitrazh
courts. Arbitrazh is often translated into English as arbitration, which is somewhat
misleading. Although arbitrazh61 courts in a few regions are conducting an experi-
ment with certain characteristics of arbitration,62 generally speaking, the arbitrazh
courts differ from arbitral tribunals in several important respects: arbitrazh court
judges are government employees; the parties do not select the judge (or judges,
in cases requiring collegial decision making); the court's jurisdiction over a partic-
ular dispute is generally governed by law, rather than by agreement of the parties;
the court may not act ex aequo et bono, but rather must resolve disputes according
to substantive law; and the court's decision is subject to review for substantive
errors by higher courts.
The jurisdiction of the arbitrazh courts is defined in part by the juridical status
of the parties. With few exceptions, recourse to the courts is available only to legal
entities and to physical persons having formally registered with the appropriate
60. For further discussion on difficulties with enforcement, see infra Part IV.H.
61. In order to avoid confusion, the author uses the term arbitrazh rather than its literal English
counterpart, arbitration, when referring to the courts. A true arbitral tribunal is referred to in Russian
as a treteiskii sud.
62. See discussion at infra Part IV.E.
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authorities as entrepreneurs.63 With respect to such parties, the jurisdiction of
the courts extends to all contract and property disputes, bankruptcy cases, cases
concerning injury to business reputation, and review of state administrative acts
in the economic sphere, such as licensing or registration decisions, tax matters,
government liability in tort, confiscation of land or other valuables, and imposition
of fines and other penalties. 64 In short, the arbitrazh courts are responsible for
the "protection of violated or contested rights and legitimate interests" of legal
entities and registered entrepreneurs "in the field of entrepreneurial and other
business activity.' 65
The delimitation of the courts' jurisdiction according to the status of the parties
(i. e., legal entities and registered entrepreneurs) is founded more on historical
circumstance than any policy rationale. As discussed in the following section of
this article, the arbitrazh courts are the successors to Soviet-era institutions
charged with adjudicating economic disputes between state enterprises. In that
capacity, they had no responsibility for disputes involving individuals.
Prior to July 1, 1995, the arbitrazh courts did not have jurisdiction over foreign
entities, or even Russian entities with foreign investment, unless all parties to
the dispute acquiesced. Cognizance over disputes with foreign parties was vested
in the courts of general jurisdiction (referred to in this article as general courts). 67
Arbitrazh court jurisdiction was extended to foreign entities and entrepreneurs
with the enactment of a new Code of Arbitrazh Procedure in 1995.6' This develop-
ment was welcomed by Western lawyers because the general courts had little
expertise in handling commercial disputes. 69
63. Arbitrazhnyi protsessualnyi kodeks RF [Code of Arbitrazh Procedure of the RF], Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 19, Item No. 1709 [hereinafter 1995 CAP], art. 22. Although the arbitrazh
courts have jurisdiction over physical persons not registered as entrepreneurs in certain situations
(see id. art 22.4), the precise extent of that jurisdiction is a subject of some debate in Russian legal
circles. See, e.g., Boris Polonski, Nekotorie tonkosti arbitrazhnovo protsessa [Some Fine Points
of Arbitrazh Process], 6 ZAKON, June 1996, at 119; C. Kaiurov, Individualnyi predprinimatel v
arbitrazhnom protsesse [The Individual Enteprepreneur in the Arbitrazh Process], KHOZ. I PRAVO,
Sept. 1996, at 143.
64. The authority of arbitrazh courts with respect to administrative decisions extends only to
executive acts, not normative (i.e., legislative) acts, which may be challenged only in the RF Constitu-
tional Court. See Ob arbitrazhnom sudakh v RF [RF Federal Constitutional Law, On Arbitrazh
Courts], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 18, Item No. 1589 [hereinafter 1995 Arbitrazh Law],
art. 10(4).
65. Id. art. 5.
66. Arbitrazhnyi protsessualnyi kodeks RF [RF Code of Arbitrazh Procedure], Vedomosti RF,
1992, No. 16, Item No. 836 [hereinafter "1992 CAP"], art. 20. See also Postanovlenie No. 12/
12 Plenuma Verkhovnovo Suda RF i Plenuma Vyshevo Arbitrazhnovo Suda RF, 0 nekotorykh
voprosakh podvedomstvennosti del po sudam i arbitrazhnym sudam [On Certain Matters Regarding
the Jurisdiction of the General Courts and Arbitrazh Courts], VESTNIK VYSSHEvo ARBITRAZHNOVO
SUDA [hereinafter VESTN. VYSSH. ARB. SUDA RF], 1992, No. 1, p. 84.
67. GPK RF [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 25.
68. 1995 CAP arts. 22.6, 210, 212.
69. Lev Simkim & Ted Smith, Foreign Investors Win Greater Access to Arbitration Courts, 5
E./W. EXEC. GUIDE, Aug. 1995, at 19; Eric Anderson, Arbitration Courts Given Jurisdiction Over
Many Commercial Issues, 5 E./W. EXEC. GUIDE, Dec. 1995, at 26.
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There is some question whether the general courts retained concurrent jurisdic-
tion over disputes involving foreign parties, including foreign legal entities and
persons registered as entrepreneurs. This possibility arises because the statutory
provisions conferring general court jurisdiction over foreign parties have not
been repealed.7° Nevertheless, most commentators (including Supreme Arbitrazh
Court justices who have addressed the topic) believe that concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to legal entities and registered entrepreneurs is not contemplated."
The general courts continue to have responsibility for enforcing foreign arbitral
awards. The International Arbitration Law states that an application to enforce
an award shall be made to the "competent court,' ' 72 without defining which
court, general or arbitrazh. However, Soviet-era laws (which continue in effect
unless they conflict with Russian Federation laws) provide that jurisdiction over
the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards rests with the
general courts.73
Notwithstanding such jurisdictional anomalies, most commercial litigation is
conducted in the arbitrazh courts. Accordingly, these courts are the focus of the
remainder of this article.
B. ARBITRAZH IN THE SOVIET PERIOD
The origins of the arbitrazh courts lie in the Soviet centrally planned economy.
Soviet arbitrazh bodies served to resolve economic contract disputes between
state enterprises, which even in the USSR exercised some degree of autonomy.
Although the state owned all means of production, the Communist leadership
recognized the need to allow enterprises to exercise operational management
over certain state property. State enterprises were also juridical persons capable of
concluding contracts. Their economic independence was sharply circumscribed,
however, by the administrative-command system, which centralized economic
decision making through the national economic plan.74
Thus, the contract disputes resolved through Soviet arbitrazh were, in certain
70. See C. Zagrebnev, Podvedomstvennost sporov s uchastiem inostrannykh investorov-
iuridicheskikh lits [Jurisdiction of Disputes with the Participation of Foreign Persons], KHoz. I
PRAVO, Aug. 1996, at 85.
71. See, e.g., ArbitrazhnyisudRossii: Opytiproblemyrealizatsiinovovozakonodatelstva ("krug-
lyi stol" zhurnala) lne Russian Arbitrazh Court: Experience and Problems in the Realization of
the New Legislation (Journal Roundtable)], 7 Gos. I PRAVo 3, 7, 6, 27 (1995) (roundtable discussion
of arbitrazh court judges); Anderson, supra note 69, at 26.
72. Int'l Arb. Law, art. 35.
73. See 1988 Arbitration Decree, supra note 58, 2; GPK RF, arts. 338 and 437. The Supreme
Arbitrazh Court has confirmed that international arbitration awards, including those of the ICAC,
"shall be recognized and executed" by the general courts. See Informational Letter of the Supreme
Arbitrazh Courtof the RF No. S- 13/OSZ-268 regarding Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
issued Aug. 25. 1993, VESTN. VyssH. ARB. SUDA RF, 1993, No. 10.
74. See generally Olympiad S. loffe, Law and Economy in the USSR, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1591,
1613-1617 (1982).
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respects, different from those arising in a market economy.75 For instance, a
significant percentage of arbitrazh cases consisted of pre-contract disputes, in
which an enterprise filed a claim to compel another to enter into a contract (most
often a supply agreement) in order to enable the enterprise to satisfy its obligations
under the plan.76
Despite their judicial function, arbitrazh institutions were not considered
courts. Arbitrazh personnel were "civil servants dependent on and subordinate
to the executive branch of government." 77 They did not enjoy the theoretical
independence of general court judges.
In addition to resolving economic contract disputes, arbitrazh also served to
improve the functioning of the economy by investigating shortcomings in the
economic activity of enterprises and the planning system. Arbitrazh personnel
(known in the Soviet period as arbiters) were responsible for notifying an enter-
prise's management or the appropriate government ministry of defects in eco-
nomic performance, suggesting methods of correction, and, if necessary, recom-
mending to the appropriate authorities the imposition of disciplinary, financial,
or penal sanctions. 78
Even in their adjudicative role, arbiters focused less upon the interests of the
parties to a dispute than upon the functioning of the economy as a whole. The
primary concern of arbiters, particularly in the early Soviet period, was economic
expediency, rather than the rights or relative fault of the parties.
Consequently, arbitrazh proceedings were informal and speedy. Arbiters were
required to render a decision in pre-contract disputes within fifteen days of a
suit being filed and, in all other disputes, within thirty days of filing.79 Arbiters
were not bound by formal rules of evidence.80
Telephone justice was not commonly practiced in arbitrazh proceedings. Based
upon extensive interviews in the early 1980s of Soviet lawyers and arbiters who
75. Stanislav Pomorski, State Arbitrazh in the USSR: Development, Functions, Organization,
9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 61, 67-68 (1977).
76. LOUISE SHELLEY, LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE 58-61 (1984).
77. Pomorski, supra note 75, at 110.
78. The nonjudicial nature of this function is illustrated by the following description by one
arbiter of her work in the mid-1980s:
"When the collective farms raised potatoes, vegetables, and fruit .... there was a
colossal quantity lost on the way from the field to the store ... For a year we tried
to follow this small chain, where is the potato? Where has it disappeared to? . . .A
slogan was even developed: "For the potato without nitrates and for socialism without
embezzlers of public funds."
Phoebe W. Brown, Russian Women Lawyers in Post-Soviet Russia, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381,
410 (1996).
79. Pomorski, supra note 75, at 100, n. 228.
80. Id. at 100. There were, however, rules setting forth general requirements that evidence be
relevant, as well as provisions concerning the burden of proof, taking notice of commonly known
facts (similar to judicial notice), and other broad principles. K. IULDELSON, ARBITRAZH V SSSR
[ARBITRAZH IN THE USSR], 99-113 (1984).
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had emigrated to the United States and to Israel, Louise Shelley concluded that
arbiters were more autonomous than general court judges:
Judges seek to pronounce politically correct decisions, whereas [arbiters] strive to reach
correct legal decisions. Judges cannot be impartial figures in the court process but must
favor the government's side in both civil and criminal cases. . . [Arbiters] can be
more autonomous because they are not forced to choose between the government and
a private individual. Only rarely does the [Communist] Party interfere in the arbitra[zh]
process.8
As compared to the general courts, moreover, arbitrazh was relatively free of
corruption, in part because the stakes in an economic dispute between state-owned
enterprises were generally lower than in, say, a criminal case, in which defendants
would be willing to pay large sums of money to shorten their prison terms.82 In
addition, arbiters were less likely than general court judges to be members of
the Communist Party and, therefore, lacked the Party protection that helped
shield members of the judiciary from prosecution. 3 Yet, the relative absence of
corruption among arbiters was not entirely a function of lack of opportunity.
Shelley's interviewees also indicated that bribery was particularly restrained in
the major cities, where decisions appearing to be influenced by corruption were
readily detected. As stated by one former arbiter: "The most that I could do for
an organization that offered me a bribe was to find a loophole to aid their case.' '
The consensus of most Western scholars, including those with a jaundiced
view of Soviet justice, was that the arbitrazh system manifested "continuously
growing concern about the protection of the rights of enterprises and associations,
the increased role of economic contracts, and observance of legality in the national
economy. '' 85 As noted by Professor Hazard, this evolution was driven by the
pragmatic recognition that "the administration of the economy improves as direc-
tors sense that . . . there will be an honest attempt made by the [arbiters] to
determine fault" in the event of a contract dispute.86 Indeed, the present Chairman
of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, Veniamin Yakovlev, views contemporary ar-
bitrazh court reforms as the continuation of a process that began in 1965 in
connection with Brezhnev's early efforts to liberalize the Soviet economy. 87
C. THE POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION OF ARBITRAZH
With the demise of the Soviet Union, there was some question whether ar-
bitrazh, as a creature of central planning, had any meaningful role to play in a
81. SHELLEY, supra note 76, at 71.
82. Id. at 93-94.
83. Id. at 94.
84. Id.
85. Pomorski, supra note 75, at 111. See also John N. Hazard, Production Discipline: The Role
of State Arbitration in the USSR, 4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 297 (1982).
86. Hazard, supra note 85, at 325.
87. Arbitrazhnyi sud Rossii, supra note 71, at 5.
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market economy.'8 Nevertheless, in 1991 the Russian legislature, deciding that
the general courts were wholly unprepared to adjudicate business disputes, elected
to transform the arbitrazh bodies into a new system of commercial courts.8 9 Two
pieces of legislation, the Arbitrazh Court Act, enacted on July 4, 1991,90 and
the Code of Arbitrazh Procedure, enacted on March 5, 1992 (the 1992 CAP), 9'
implemented sweeping changes with respect to arbitrazh. Arbiters were recog-
nized as judges, thereby affording them various protections set forth in judicial
reform legislation. 92 The arbitrazh court legislation also included separate guaran-
tees of permanent tenure, 9 independence, 9 and judicial immunity. 95 In addition,
arbitrazh procedure was modified, a Supreme Arbitrazh Court created, and a
defined appellate process established.
96
Further structural changes were implemented in 1995 with the enactment of
the Federal Constitutional Law on Arbitrazh Courts 97 and a new Code of Arbitrazh
Procedure (the 1995 CAP). 98 The 1995 legislation substantially reduced the invest-
igative role of the judge, moved court proceedings further toward an adversarial
model, 99 extended the jurisdiction of the courts equally to Russian and foreign
entities alike,')° accorded the courts federal status (thereby reducing their depen-
dence on local government patronage),'0 ' and established a level of intermediate
appellate courts known as circuit courts.'°2
88. Viechtbauer, supra note 17, at 443.
89. Id. at 447. Several other Soviet bloc countries have also transformed their arbitrazh bodies
into economic or commercial courts. See, e.g., William Craig, Dispute Resolution in Vietnam, 14
INT'L FIN. L. REV. 36 (1995). For a comparative analysis of arbitrazh institutions in several commu-
nist countries, see ARBITRAZH V MEKHANIZME SOTSIALISTICHESKOVo KHOZIAISTVOVANIIA STRAN-
CHLENOV S.E.V. [ARBITRAZH IN THE MECHAMISM OF THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY OF THE MEMBER-
STATES OF THE CMEA] (T.E. Abova ed., 1988).
90. Zakon ob arbitrazhnomsude [Arbitrazh Court Act], Vedomostiizmenenii i dopolnenii v zakon
RSFSR, Ob arbitrazhnom sude [Amendment to the RF Arbitrazh Court Act], Vedomosti Fed. Sobr.
RF. 1992, No. 34, Item No. 1965 [hereinafter 1991 Arbitrazh Act].
91. 1992 CAP.
92. See, e.g., Zakon RF o statuse sudei v RF [Law on Status of Judges of the RF], Vedomosti
Fed. Sobr. RF, 1992, No. 9, Item No. 223.
93. 1991 Arbitrazh Act, art. 20.
94. Id. art. 23.
95. Id. art. 24.
96. Id. art. 10. Although there were no formal avenues of appeal under the Soviet system, chief
arbiters and their deputies reviewed the correctness of decisions through a procedure known as
supervision (nadzor). ABOVA, supra note 90, at 171-72.
97. 1995 Arbitrazh Law, supra note 64.
98. 1995 CAP.
99. See generally 1995 CAP art. 7, chs. 6, 16. See also V. Anokhin, Problemy arbitrazhnovo
suda i protsessa [Problems of the Arbitrazh Court Process], KHOz. I PRAvO, April 1997, at 173.
100. 1995 CAP arts. 22.6. 210, 212.
101. 1995 Arbitrazh Law, art. 2. See also Press Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Grigor.
Karasin and Supreme Arbitrazh Court Chairman Veniamin Yakovlev, FED. NEWS SVC.-KREMLtIN
PKG. (June 8, 1995), available in 1995 WL 7570435 [hereinafter Yakovlev Press Briefing]; Arbitrazh-
nyi sud Rossii, supra note 71, at 6.
102. 1995 Arbitrazh Law, Ch. III.
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D. ARBITRAZH COURT JUDGES AND JUDICIAL PANELS
There are presently about 2,000 arbitrazh court judges, many of whom are
former arbiters inherited from the Soviet arbitrazh system.' 03 According to the
Russian Constitution, judges must be twenty-five or older, hold a law degree,
and have worked for five years in the legal profession.'o4 In Russia, as in many
European countries, the judiciary is primarily comprised of persons who became
judges near the beginning of their legal careers. Many gain the requisite legal
experience for a judgeship by working as staff lawyers (specialists) for the courts.
Judges are among the highest paid officials in the Russian Government.' 05 A
1997 Yeltsin decree increased the average judge's monthly pay by 65 percent,
from 2 million rubles ($345) to 3.2 million rubles ($550).'06 That amount, while
meager by the standards of the Russian nouveaux riche, compares favorably to
the average Russian monthly wage of 828,500 rubles ($143).' °7
Nevertheless, as a class, judges do not enjoy nearly the same social standing
and prestige as their American or Western European counterparts. There is also
a wide compensation gap between judges and private attorneys, particularly in
major cities. The Chairman of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court complains that the
courts "hardly manage to get a specialist trained before he is grabbed" by the
private sector. 108
The 1992 CAP required that most cases be decided by a panel of three judges.'09
The 1995 CAP scaled back the use of collegial decision making. In the lower
courts, three-judge panels are now reserved for bankruptcy cases, challenges to
government actions, and reviews in the appellate instance.1
°
E. ARBITRAZH COURT ASSESSORS
Arbitrazh courts in several regions, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, are
conducting a three-year experiment of trying cases before panels composed of
103. V. F. Yakovlev, Arbitrazhnym sudam-vsestoronnee obespechenie [Thorough Guarantees
to the Arbitrazh Courts], Ross. IUST., April 1997, at 7, 8.
104. KONST. RF (1993) art. 119.
105. Mikhail S. Paleev, The Establishment of an Independent Judiciary in Russia, I PARKER SCH.
J. E. EUR. L. 647, 655 (1994).
106. Ukaz Prezidenta RF, Ob uvelichenii dolzhnostnykh okladov sudei sudov RF [Decree of
President of RF, On Increasing Salaries of Judges of Courts of the RF], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997,
No. 4, Item No. 526; Bronwyn McLaren, Beleaguered Judges Get 65% Pay Raise, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997 <http://www.spb.ru/times/284-285/beleaguered.html>.
107. Vladimir Bobkov, Incomes and Living Standards in the First Quarter of the Year, RIA-
NOVOSTI DAILY REVIEW (May 8, 1997) <http://www.ria.novost.com/products/ds/1997/05/08-1-5-
htm>.
108. Valentin Maslennikov, Judge Discusses New Laws on Arbitration Court Procedures, Ros-
SISKAYA GAZETA [hereinafter Ross. GAZETA], 22 Feb. 1995, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-0485, Mar.
13, 1995, at 38 (interview with V. F. Yakovlev). See also Yakovlev, supra note 104, at 8.
109. 1992 CAP art. 4.
110. 1995 CAP art. 14. With regard to the appellate instance, see discussion infra, Part IV.G.
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one professional judge and two laypersons (known as assessors) with knowledge
of business and entrepreneurship."' Most assessors are drawn from the private
arbitral tribunals sponsored by various Russian trade associations, chambers of
commerce, and stock and commodity exchanges. 112 The list of eligible assessors
is approved by the plenum of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court. Each assessor has
an equal vote with the judge. 113 The assessors are used only with the assent of
the parties, who may nominate particular assessors to participate in the case.
The experiment superficially resembles the use of people's assessors in the
general courts, who are typically representatives of local unions and enterprises.
People's assessors are ostensibly the judges' equals, but are nicknamed nodders
because they tend to defer to the judges' decisions.'"
The Chairman of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court rejects comparison to the peo-
ple's assessors and states that the experiment is inspired by the French commercial
courts (the tribunaux de commerce), which also sit in tribunals composed of a
professional judge and two laypersons." 5 The Chairman is an ardent champion
of the experiment, believing that the assessors will enhance confidence in the
fairness of the courts and in the courts' ability to handle commercial disputes." 1
6
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the assessors in that regard. A few
Russian lawyers have advised the author that they typically forgo the use of
arbitrazh assessors, in part because of their experience with assessors in the
general courts. Nevertheless, the arbitrazh assessors, by virtue of their back-
grounds, are likely to be more assertive than those in the general courts and
should serve to some degree as a check on arbitrary judicial decision making.
F. ARBITRAZH COURT PRACTICE
1. Initiating the Case
A case is initiated in arbitrazh court with the filing of a statement of claim."1
The statement sets forth the plaintiff's case in a comprehensive manner, including
citations to the laws upon which the claim is based. The plaintiff s evidence must
also be attached to the statement." 8
111. See Zakon o vvedenii v deistvie Arbitrazhnovo protsessualnovo kodeksa RF [Law on Imple-
mentation of the RF Code of Arbitrazh Procedure], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 19, Item No.
1710, art. No. 8.
112. T. Andreeva, Zasedateli varbitrazhnomprotsesse [Assessors in the Arbitrazh Process], Ross.
IusT., May 1997, at 49. For a description of these arbitral bodies, see Katharina Pistor, Supply and
Demand for Contract Enforcement in Russia: Courts, Arbitration, and Private Enforcement, 22 REV.
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 55, 69-71 (1996).
113. Law on Implementation of the RF Code of Arbitrazh Procedure, supra note 112, art. 8.2.
114. ROBERT RAND, COMRADE LAWYER 3-4, 41, 42 (1991); Stephen Thaman, Reform of the
Procuracy and Bar in Russia, 3 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 1, 7 (1996).
115. Yakovlev Press Briefing, supra note 102; Yuri Feofanov, There Will Be No Jurors in the
Court of Arbitration, IZVEST11A, Dec. 24, 1994, at 4.
116. Arbitrazhnyi sud Rossii, supra note 71, at 8-9.
117. 1995 CAP art. 102.
118. Id. art. 102.5.
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The claim must generally be filed with the court in the jurisdiction in which
the defendant, or one of the defendants in a multi-defendant case, is located." 9
The new Civil Code contemplates that once a law on state registration of legal
entities is enacted, the location of a legal entity will be determined by its place
of registration. 20 In the meantime, a joint decree of the Supreme (General) Court
and the Supreme Arbitrazh Court directs that "it shall be considered in dispute
resolution that the location of a legal entity is defined as the location of its
organs,"'' which apparently means the entity's headquarters or primary place
of business.
In a contract action, the plaintiff has the option of filing in the venue where
the contract was to be performed. 122 The venue of an action may also be established
by agreement of the parties. 123 This works to the benefit of a foreign party wishing
to designate a court outside its Russian contract partner's locality to hear any
disputes. 124
Filing fees in arbitrazh court can be substantial. Prior to August 1994 the state
duty for filing most cases equalled 10 percent of the value of the claim. 2' This
exorbitant rate discouraged recourse to the arbitrazh courts.1
26
Since 1994 the state duty for most claims is determined according to a sliding
scale, currently ranging from 5 percent to .05 percent, depending upon the amount
of the claim. '27 A claim valued at one billion rubles (currently around $170,000),
for instance, will result in a levy of 16.6 million rubles (roughly $2,800), which
constitutes an effective duty rate of 1.66 percent. 128 The maximum state duty is
1,000 times the monthly minimum wage (currently about $14,000). 129 Upon a
119. Id. arts. 25, 26.
120. GK RF art. 51.
121. Postanovlenie No. 6/8 Plenuma Verkhovonovo Suda RF i Plenuma Vyshevo Arbitrazhnovo
Suda RF, 0 nekotorykh voprosakh, sviazannykh s primeneniem chasti pervoi Grazhdanskovo Kodeksa
RF [Decree No. 6/8 of Plenums of Supreme Court and Supreme Arbitrazh Court, On Certain Questions
Associated with Application of Part I of the Civil Code], issued Aug. 10, 1996, reprinted in Ross.
IUST., Oct. 1996, at 57, 59, 21.
122. 1995 CAP art. 26.4.
123. Id. art. 30.
124. See Tatiana Neshatayeva, 0 nekotorykh problemakh, voznikaiushchikh pri rassmotrenii
sporov s uchastiem inostrannykh lits [On Several Problems Arising in Connection with Disputes
Involving Foreign Persons], 10 VESTN. VYssH. ARB. SUDA RF, 1996, No. 10, pp. 139-40.
125. 1992 CAP art. 69.
126. Press Conference with RF Vice Premier, Economy Minister Alexander Shokhin, FED. NEWS
SVc.-KREMLIN PPG. (Sept. 20, 1994) <http://www.fnsg.com>.
127. 1995 CAP art. 92; Instructions of the RF State Tax Service No. 42 of May 15, 1996, on
the Application of the RF Law on State Duty, Chap. V (art. 28) [hereinafter State Duty Instructions],
published in Ross. GAZETA, July 27, 1996.
128. State Duty Instructions, supra note 128, art. 28.
129. Id. The monthly minimum wage is currently 83,490 rubles, which equals approximately $14.
Jeff Kadet & Scott Antel, The Good News, and Bad News, About the New Russian Tax Amendments, 7
E./W. EXEC. GUIDE, Mar. 1, 1997, at 8.
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showing of financial hardship, the duty may be paid in installments or deferred
altogether pending judgment. 30
The 1995 CAP specifically provides for the dismissal of a claim if the dispute
is within the scope of an arbitration agreement. 3' The right to arbitrate is forfeited,
however, if the party fails to file an application to transfer the proceeding to an
arbitration tribunal prior to making its "first statement on the essence of the
dispute.' 132
2. Interim Relief
A claimant may obtain pre-judgment relief "at any stage of the arbitrazh pro-
cess," including an arrest of property or a preliminary injunction, if the absence
of such relief might cause "interference with or render impossible the execution
of the judicial act." 133 The court must act upon a request for interim relief within
one day. '34 Failure to comply with an interim order may result in the imposition of a
fine of up to 50 percent of the face value of the claim in an action seeking a liquidated
amount, or up to 200 times the minimum monthly wage in other cases. 35 The claim-
ant may recover damages for losses incurred because of the failure of any person
(party or nonparty) to comply with an interim order.136
3. The Court Proceedings
In preparation for trial, the judge reviews the documentary evidence previously
submitted by the parties and suggests what other evidence should be presented. 1
37
There is no provision for direct, party-to-party discovery; however, a party may
submit a request to the court to secure any needed documentary evidence.
138
Refusal by the court to grant such a request is subject to appeal. "9 The court
may order the production of evidence from both parties and nonparties and may
impose a fine of up to 200 times the monthly minimum wage upon a person
refusing to comply.'40
130. Postanovlenie No. 6 Plenuma Vyshevo Arbitrazhnovo Suda RF, 0 nekotorykh voprosakh
primeneniia arbitrazhnami sudami zakonodatel'stva RF o gosudarstvennoi poshline [Decree No. 6
of Plenum of Supreme Arbitrazh Court on Application of RF Legislation Regarding State Duties],
issued Mar. 20, 1997, reprinted in Ross. JUST., June 1997, at 53. Several classes of claimants,
including, for instance, governmental entities, are exempt from the duty altogether. State Duty
Instructions, supra note 128, art. 33.
131. 1995 CAP arts. 23, 87.
132. Id. art. 87.2. See Informational Letter of Dec. 26, 1996, supra note 12, at 96-99 (discussing
two cases involving foreign parties, British and German, which waived arbitration pursuant to this
provision).
133. 1995 CAP art. 75.1.
134. Id. art. 75.2.
135. Id. art. 76.3.
136. Id. art. 76.4.
137. Id. arts. 112, 53.2.
138. Id. arts. 54.2, 71.
139. Id. art. 71.4.
140. Id. art. 54.3.
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Parties are not required to use a lawyer. According to one informal survey,
more than half appear pro se. 4 ' A significant proportion of the lawyers who
practice in arbitrazh court are iurisconsulty (in-house enterprise lawyers), as
opposed to advokaty (independent attorneys belonging to the collegia of advo-
cates). 142
Although the arbitrazh courts are moving toward an adversarial model, the
judge, not the lawyers, continues to take center stage at trial. The 1995 CAP
charges the court with "ensuring that the circumstances, essential for the case,
are clarified." 43 The judge controls the sequence of proof 44 and is typically
the principal examiner of witnesses. The lawyer's role in most cases is to ask
supplementary questions and to present arguments on behalf of the client. Testi-
mony tends to be in narrative form, as opposed to the tight question-and-answer
format to which American lawyers are accustomed. As in many civil law coun-
tries, oral testimony is given little weight in relation to documentary evidence.
A party may request that the court retain an expert and make suggestions
as to the particular expert to be retained. 45 Nevertheless, the court ultimately
determines whether an expert is necessary, 146 selects the expert, and formulates
the questions to be presented (albeit with input from the parties).
47
Parties may seek recusal of judges and experts on several grounds, primarily
relating to partiality. 148 Parties (or their counsel) are also guaranteed the right
to present evidence, conduct cross-examination, object to the other party's proof,
make statements, and present arguments on all issues. 149
The court is responsible for determining the existence and the content of foreign
law, if applicable to the dispute. 50 This may be accomplished through assistance
from Russian agencies and institutions (such as the Ministry of Justice or Russian
embassies abroad) or through expert testimony. If the court cannot determine
the foreign law, Russian law may be applied.''
141. Kathryn Hendley et al., Observations on the Use ofLawby Russian Enterprises, IRsIS WORKING
PAPER SERIES (No. 201), Apr. 1997, at 6.
142. For a discussion of the Russian legal profession, see William Meyer, Facing the Post-
Communist Reality: Lawyers in Private Practice in Central and Eastern Europe and the Republics
of the Former Soviet Union, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1019 (1995).
143. 1995 CAP art. 115.2.
144. Id.
145. Id. art. 66.
146. Id. art. 66.1. The court apparently may not retain an expert, however, unless expert testimony
is requested by the parties. See C. Morgunov, APK RF otdelniye stati nuzhdaiutsa v konkretizatsii
[The Arbitrazh Procedure Code: Certain Articles Require Revision], Ross. IuST., Aug. 1996, at 43,
44.
147. 1995 CAP arts. 66.2, 3.
148. Id. arts. 16-17, 19-20.
149. Id. art. 33.
150. Id. art. 12.1. Conflict of laws principles are not set forth in the CAP itself, but rather are
addressed in other Russian laws.
151. Id. art. 12.3.
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4. The Case Term
Proceedings before the arbitrazh courts are expeditious. The court must issue
a decision within two months of the filing of a claim. 152 This mandate represents
an increase of one month from the time limit for decisions in Soviet arbitrazh.
To an American lawyer accustomed to litigating a case for years at the trial level,
this increase might appear insignificant. Nevertheless, at the time of the change
in 1992 Russia was experiencing skyrocketing inflation and some Russian judges
were concerned that justice delayed, even by a month, was justice denied.' 53
More recently, Russian commentators have expressed concern that two months
does not allow the court sufficient time in complex cases. Thus, some suggest
the time limit be extended for certain categories of disputes. 1
5 4
The speed with which arbitrazh courts process cases might be viewed as an
indication that they have yet to move beyond the assembly line justice administered
by their Soviet precursors. Case statistics indicate this is not entirely the case.
The annual case load of Soviet arbiters ranged from 1,200 to 1,800 cases. 15 5 The
current goal for individual judges, as laid down by the Supreme Arbitrazh Court,
is 120 to 144 cases per year. 156 Moreover, approximately 40 percent of arbitrazh
court cases are simple claims for nonpayment for goods or services, which are
often susceptible to routine disposition. '
5. The Final Decision
The final decision is announced at the conclusion of the trial, 158 typically after
a brief recess in which the judge (or panel) considers the matter. A written
decision must be issued within three days, describing the evidence upon which
the decision is based, stating the grounds for rejecting any items of proof, referring
to the legal norms which guided the court, and setting forth the disposition of
the matter. 159 A judgment enters into force thirty days after issuance, unless the
152. Id. art. 114. Arbitrazh court data indicate that the courts exceeded this time limit in only
1.6% of all cases in 1995, and 3.6% in 1996. Sudebno-arbitrazhnaya statistika [Arbitrazh Court
Statistics], VESTN. VYSSH. ARB. SUDA RF, 1997, No. 4, pp. 102-03 [hereinafter 1996 Arbitrazh
Court Statistics].
153. Inflation has since abated-from an annual rate of 2,642% in 1992 to 22% in 1996. David
Mapley, Investing in Russia: The Upside Is Enormous, 6 E./W. EXEC. GUIDE, Dec. 1996, at 2, 23.
154. See, e.g., B. Zavidov, Arbitrazhnyi protsessualnyi kodeks: osnovnye idei i printsipy [The
Arbitrazh Procedure Code: Basic Concepts and Principles], Ross. IUST., Mar. 1996, at 35, 38
(referring to views expressed by unidentified learned jurists).
155. SHELLEY, supra note 76, at 50; see also Hazard, supra note 85, at 309.
156. YAKOVLEV, supra note 104, at 8.
157. 1996Arbitrazh Court Statistics, supra note 153, at 104. Moreover, according to the Chairman
of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, a "huge" number of cases are dismissed for "formal" reasons
(i.e., lack of jurisdiction or failure to pay the state duty). Report on Arbitration Court Prospects,
EKSPERT, Feb. 19, 1996, at 18, translated in FBIS-SOV-96-064, Apr. 2, 1996, at 36; see also
PISTAR, supra note 113, at 75,
158. 1995 CAP art. 134.
159. Id. art. 127.
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judgment is appealed. 160 It is "binding on all state bodies, local self government
bodies, other organs, organizations, officials, and private persons" and may be
executed "on the entire territory of the Russian Federation." 1
61
Court costs, including the state duty, are allocated between the parties in propor-
tion to the extent to which the plaintiff prevailed on its claim. 162 Regarding attorney
fees, the arbitrazh courts essentially follow the American rule. Each side pays its
own fees unless otherwise stipulated by agreement. The Code of Civil Procedure,
which governs civil actions in general court, was amended in November 1995
to adopt the English rule, whereby the loser pays the prevailing party's attorney
fees. 163 This amendment may be a harbinger of future changes in the arbitrazh
court rule.
G. APPELLATE REVIEW IN THE ARBITRAZH COURTS
In the first level of appeal, known as the appellate instance, a panel of three
judges from the same court that originally decided the matter hears the case.164
The judge who decided the case in the initial instance may not serve on the
panel.165 The panel reviews both the facts and the law de novo, generally retrying
the case; however, new evidence may be submitted only upon a showing that it
could not have been presented in the proceeding below. 66 The judgment is stayed
pending the court's review. 67 Approximately 13 percent of cases were appealed
to the appellate instance in 1996.161
Some Russian jurists express concern that conducting the appellate instance
in the same court that initially decided the matter undermines the efficacy of the
process. 69 Nevertheless, review at the appellate instance does not appear to be
a rubber stamp. Between 1994 and 1996, almost one-quarter of all cases appealed
to that level were reversed or modified.
70
160. Id. art. 147.
161. 1995 Arbitrazh Law, art. 7.
162. 1995 CAP art. 95.
163. GPK RF, art. 91.
164. 1995 CAP arts. 145-160.
165. Id. art. 18.1; see also Postanovlenie No. 13 Plenuma Vyshevo Arbitrazhnovo Suda RF "0
primenenii Arbitrazhnovo protsessualnovo kodeksa RF pri rassmotrenii del v sude pervoi instantsii"
[Decree No. 13 of Plenum of Supreme Arbitrazh Court, On Application of CAP in Examination of
Cases in Court of First Instance], issued Oct. 31, 1996, reprinted in Ross. GAZETA, Nov. 27, 1996,
at6, 1.
166. 1995 CAP art. 18.1.
167. Id. art. 156.
168. 1996 Arbitrazh Court Statistics, supra note 153, at 103.
169. See, e.g., V. Sherstuk, Prediavlenie apelliatsionnoi zhaloby v arbitrazhnyi sud [Presentation
of the Appellate Complaint to Arbitrazh Court], KHOZ. I PRAVO, Oct. 1996, at 91, 93; 0. Boikov,
Novoe zakonodatel 'stvo ob arbitrazhnykh sudakh [New Legislation on Arbitrazh Courts], Ross. IusT.,
Aug. 1995, at 10, 12.
170. Arbitrazh Court Statistics, supra note 153, at 103; Sudebno-arbitrazhnaya statistika [Ar-
bitrazh Court Statistics], VESTN. VYssH. ARB. SUDA RF, 1996, No. 3, pp. 102-03 [hereinafter 1995
Arbitrazh Court Statistics].
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One disincentive to pursuing an appeal is the state duty, which equals 50 percent
of the duty paid in the court of first instance. State duties on appeal are capped at
500 times the monthly minimum wage (approximately $7,200 at current exchange
rates). 171
The second level of appeal, known as cassation, lies with the circuit courts
created by the 1995 legislation. There are ten judicial circuits, each covering
several constituent federal units of the RF. 172 The upper chamber of the Russian
legislature (the Federation Council) initially voted down the legislation creating
the circuit courts. 173 In commenting upon the Federation Council vote, the Chair-
man of the RF Constitutional Court, Vladimir Tumanov, noted that "[i]n pre-
revolutionary Russia the district of the Moscow judicial chamber. . . embraced
several provinces. This is a major guarantee of judicial independence from the
local authorities. . . . [M]any senators and regional leaders do not want to lose
control over the courts. " 174 Nevertheless, when the law ultimately passed in April
1995 the provisions regarding circuit courts were left intact, dealing a blow to
the efforts of local leaders to exercise control over the arbitrazh courts sitting
in their territories. 1
75
As in the appellate instance, circuit court appeals are heard by a panel of three
judges.76 Cassationary review is limited to issues of law.177 Between 1995 and
1996, the circuit courts reversed or modified the lower court's decision in 40
percent of the cases decided (5,374 of 13,308 cases). 7 8 A cassationary appeal
does not automatically stay the execution of the lower court's judgment; however,
the circuit court may issue a stay upon the application of a party.' 79
Cases may be brought to the Supreme Arbitrazh Court only through the process
of supervision (nadzor). Supervision is initiated by a protest filed by the Chairman
of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, the Procurator GeneralW of the RF, or their
respective deputies.' 8' Although the parties themselves may not file a protest,
171. May 15, 1996, State Duty Instruction, supra note 128, art. 28.9.
172. 1995 Arbitrazh Law, art. 24.
173. Senators Turn Down Bill on Courts of Arbitration, 29 OMb DAILY DIGEST (Feb. 9, 1995)
<http://www.omri.cz/Publications/DD/Digest>. The Council is comprised of the leaders of RF's
89 constituent republics, regions, and other federal units. They hold their positions in the Russian
legislature on an ex officio basis.
174. S. Orlyuk, Is Russia Becoming a Law-Based Society? Moscow TIMES, March 17, 1995.
175. See C. Amosov, Federalnyi arbitrazhnyi sud okruga (The Federal Arbitrazh Circuit Court],
KHOZ. I PRAVO, Aug. 1996, at 114, 115; Arbitrazhnyi sud Rossii, supra note 71, at 9.
176. 1995 CAP art. 14.2.
177. Id. arts. 165, 174, 176.
178. 1996 Arbitrazh Court Statistics, supra note 153, at 104.
179. 1995 CAP art. 170.
180. The Procurator General is the rough equivalent of the U.S. Attorney General, but with
significantly broader responsibilities and powers. For a discussion of the role of the procurator in
arbitrazh proceedings, see A. Karlin, Prokuror v arbitrazhnom protsesse [The Procurator in the
Arbitrazh Process], 5 ZAKONNOST' 2 (1996). For a general discussion of the procuracy, see THAMAN,
supra note 115.
181. 1995 CAP art. 181.
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they may apply to the appropriate officials to request the filing of such protest. 182
The Court's Chairman stated that the Court will exercise supervision only in
extraordinary matters. 83 The Court's primary role is ensuring uniform judicial
practice; protecting the rights of parties in particular cases is an incidental func-
tion. 184
The scope of review in the Supreme Arbitrazh Court is narrower than in cassa-
tion; the only grounds for reversal or modification of a decision are illegality or
lack of substantiation.185 A substantively correct decision may not be reversed
on formal grounds alone. 86 Parties may be summoned to attend a court session
to present their arguments, but are not entitled to an oral hearing as a matter of
right. 87
The final form of appeal is a rehearing (peresmotr) upon the presentation of
newly discovered circumstances, which includes evidence that was not known
and could not have been known by a party, criminal actions by the participants
in the case (including the judge), and the knowing presentation of false evidence
in the prior proceedings.188 The petition for rehearing must be filed within one
month of discovery of the new circumstances. 189
H. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAZH COURT JUDGMENTS
During the Soviet era, arbitrazh decisions merely resulted in monies being
shifted from one state enterprise to another. As a result, the arbitrazh system
had little need for a strong enforcement regime. That ceased to be the case
after the collapse of the centrally planned economy. Nevertheless, the Russian
legislature was slow to develop new judicial enforcement mechanisms.'90 In a 1996
interview, the Chairman of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court described enforcement of
court rulings as the judicial system's "Achilles heel.'" 9' Speaking at a press
conference the same year, the First Vice Chair of the Russian Duma, Alexander
Shokhin, offered a blunter assessment: "It's much easier to send a group of
armed people to collect debts than to appeal to an arbitrazh court and expect its
182. 1995 CAP art. 185.
183. V.F. Yakovlev, quoted in MASLENNIKOV, supra note 109, at 40.
184. Y. Shestopal, Novye veksi, novye i starye problemy arbitrazhnovo suda [New Milestones,
New and Old Problems of the Arbitrazh Court], ZAKON, May 1996, 112, 113 (Interview with
V. F. Yakovlev).
185. 1995 CAP art. 188; see also id. art. 190.2.
186. Id. art. 188.
187. Id. art. 186.
188. Id. art. 192.
189. Id. art. 193.1.
190. I. Andreev, Ispolnenie sudebnykh reshennii [Implementation of Court Decisions], Ross.
lUST., Dec. 1996, at 37.
191. Veniamin Yakovlev, quoted in Shestopal, supra note 186, at 113. Enforcement is also a
problem for the general courts. See, Vstat! Sud idyot [All Rise! The Court Is in Session], Ross.
GAZETA, Dec. 3, 1996, at 1, 3 (interview with Supreme Court Chairman Vyachleslav Lebedev).
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rulings to be carried out promptly." 192 According to the Ministry of Justice, in
1995, only 50 percent of court rulings involving the recovery of money were
implemented. 
93
Several steps were taken during 1997 to resolve this problem. A law "On
Court Officers,' ' 194 enacted on July 21, 1997, provides for the creation of a
corps of marshals (pristavy-ispolnitel'ny) with responsibility for enforcing court
decisions. The corps will be part of the Ministry of Justice and is to become
operational by January 1, 1998, although it will not be fully staffed until at least
1999.'9' Responsibility for enforcing court decisions currently rests with poorly
paid personnel attached to the general courts,196 a group described by the former
Chairman of the Constitutional Court as "young girls or old ladies who could
not find any other job."' 97
The law "On Enforcement Proceedings,"' 9 ' also enacted in July 1997, vests
marshals with broad powers to compel compliance with court rulings. The new
law includes some interesting provisions relating to the enforcement of orders
which either restrain or require the performance of certain conduct. If a party
fails to act in accordance with such an order, the marshal imposes a fine in an
amount up to 200 times the monthly minimum wage and sets a new deadline for
compliance. '" Each successive failure to comply results in a new deadline and
a doubling of the fine.2 °° The fine must be approved by a senior Ministry of
Justice official and may be appealed to court.2' Repeated noncompliance may
result in criminal prosecution. 2
192. Press Conference with Alexander Shokhin, FED. NEWS SVC.-KREMLIN PKG. (July 26, 1996)
<http://www.fsng.com/>.
193. Press Conference with Minister of Justice Valentin Kovalyov, FED. NEWS SVc.-KREMLIN
PKG. (Dec. 6, 1995) <http://www.fnsg.com./>. See also, Andreev, supra note 190, at 37.
194. Zakon 0 sudebnykh pristavakh [Law on Court Officers], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No.
30, Item No. 3590.
195. Id. art. 25. As of this article's completion, it was unclear whether funding would be available
to meet this schedule. Yuliya Latynina, Kremlin Steels for Defense of '98 Budget, Moscow TIMES,
Sept. 2, 1997, at 8.
196. For a detailed discussion of the enforcement process in place prior to the enactment of the
1997 legislation, see Glenn P. Hendrix, Enforcement of Russian Arbitrazh Court Judgments, 7 E./
W. ExEc. GUIDE, Feb. 1997, at 16. See also Mikhail Volodarsky, Ispolnenie sudebnovo resheniia
[Implementation of a Judicial Decision], 49 EKON. I ZH., Dec. 1996, at 30; Ukaz Prezidenta RF
No. 199, Vremennoe polozhenie, 0 poriadke obrashchenia vzyskania na imushchestvo organizatsii
[Decree of President of RF No. 199, Provisional Regulations on Executions Against the Property
of Organizations], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 8, Item No. 741.
197. Press Conference with Vladimir Tumanov, Chair, Constitutional Court, FED. NEWS Svc.-
KREMLIN PKG. (July 24, 1996) <http://www.fsng.com/>.
198. Zakon Ob ispolnitnel'nom proizvodstve [Law on Enforcement Proceedings], Sobr. Zakonod.
RF, 1997, No. 30, Item No. 3591.
199. Id. arts. 73, 85.1.
200. Id. art. 85.4.
201. Id.
202. Id. art. 85.3.
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Russia's revamped Criminal Code, which became effective on January 1, 1997,
makes prosecution for contempt of court a more potent threat than previously.° 3
The former Criminal Code imposed criminal responsibility upon certain govern-
ment officials who defied a court decision, but did not extend criminal liability
to private parties. The only sanction, moreover, was a nominal fine of three to
ten times the monthly minimum wage (roughly sixteen to fifty-five dollars at
1996 exchange rates).204 The new Criminal Code imposes criminal liability on
all persons responsible for nonexecution of court decisions. The new law also
carries stiff penalties, including up to two years' imprisonment. °5
Since arbitrazh courts do not have criminal jurisdiction, they may not directly
impose criminal contempt sanctions. Rather, offenders must be prosecuted in
the general courts. Nevertheless, an arbitrazh court may directly impose civil
monetary penalties in an amount up to two hundred times the monthly minimum
wage. 206 Arbitrazh courts may also impose a fine of up to fifty percent of the
value of a judgment upon a bank that fails to heed a writ of execution. 2°' A bank
that repeatedly fails to honor writs of execution risks losing its license. 08
Although the new legislative enactments will add teeth to court rulings, enforce-
ment problems are likely to persist. Noncompliance with court decisions is, in
part, symptomatic of broader societal distrust and disrespect for the state and its
institutions, including the courts. It is also a reflection of economic conditions
in contemporary Russia. Many Russian entities are in dire financial straits. The
liquid assets of others are hidden, often abroad, not only from judgment creditors,
but also from the Russian tax authorities. As the president of a German company
with investments in Russia recently stated, "There are many legal mechanisms
[for collecting debts], but the question is, if somebody is naked, how do you
find the pockets?"2 °9
I. CAN A FOREIGN PARTY GET A FAIR SHAKE?
Can a foreign party get a fair shake in the arbitrazh courts? As noted at the
beginning of this article, reasons to fear otherwise include a judiciary with a short
history of handling sophisticated commercial disputes, an alien court procedure,
203. See UK RF [Criminal Code], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 25, Item No. 2954, art. 315.
204. UK RF [Criminal Code], art. 188.2 (superseded). In addition, until 1995, the Procurator
General construed the criminal contempt law as applicable only to general court decisions, notwith-
standing a 1993 presidential decree referring to criminal responsibility for noncompliance with ar-
bitrazh court decisions. Arbitrazhnyi sud Rossii, supra note 71, at 21 (comments of M. Falkovich).
See also Rasporiazhenie Prezidenta RF, 0 sovershenstvovanii organizatsii i deiatelnosti arbitrazhnykh
sudov RF [Edict of President of RF, On Improvement of the Organization and Operation of RF
Arbitrazh Courts], Sobr. Aktov, 1993, No. 52, Item No. 5087.
205. UK RF, supra note 205, art. 315.
206. 1995 CAP art. 206.3.
207. Id. art. 206.1
208. Id. art. 206.2.
209. A Tactical Retreat by One Foreign Investor, 7 E./W. EXEC. GUIDE, May 1997, at 3, 4.
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corruption, the threat of physical intimidation of the judge by the opposing party,
and the Russian party's home court advantage. Such concerns are legitimate, but
do not justify writing the courts off altogether.
The sophistication of the arbitrazh courts in commercial matters is steadily
increasing as they gain experience in handling business disputes. Moreover, the
Russian legislature is giving the courts better and clearer laws to work with. The
recent implementation of the second part of a new Civil Code, for instance,
represents major progress. 2 0 Indeed, the entire Russian legal profession is becom-
ing increasingly sophisticated. Most Western lawyers would be favorably im-
pressed by the level of discourse in Russian law journals, many of which feature
articles by arbitrazh court judges.
Practice in the arbitrazh courts, while quite different from American civil
procedure, does not depart radically from procedure in most continental European
courts.2 ' Many aspects of arbitrazh court practice most alien to American law-
yers-the court's active questioning of witnesses, the expert's role as the court's
witness, and the absence of party-to-party discovery-are accepted as a matter
of course by lawyers of many European countries (although these features may
be more pronounced in the arbitrazh courts due to the investigative tradition of
Soviet arbitrazh). Arbitrazh court procedure might appear strange to American
observers. Nevertheless, it is capable of affording parties a fair and efficient
hearing of their dispute.
The extent to which graft and physical intimidation influence judicial decisions
is difficult to determine; it certainly occurs. In a 1995 interview discussing the
general courts, Russia's Procurator General conceded: "Are suspects released
for bribes? I don't rule that out. Are judges forced to make decisions under
threat? That is even more probable." 2 2
Yet, while thugs are sometimes used to resolve disputes, this is not standard
business practice, as some media accounts would suggest. Moreover, because
the arbitrazh courts do not have criminal jurisdiction, they are less exposed to
criminal elements and concomitant physical threats than the general courts.
2 13
Although judges are not immune from the epidemic of corruption infecting
the Russian government, graft appears to be less widespread among the judiciary
210. See generally Lane H. Blumenfeld, Russia's New Civil Code: The Legal Foundation for
Russia's Emerging Market Economy, 30 INT'L LAW. 477-78 (1996).
211. For an article espousing the superiority of European civil procedure, see Ernst Stiefel &
James Maxeiner, Civil Justice in the United States-Opportunity for Learning from "Civilized"
European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation? 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 157 (1994).
212. Does the Public Prosecutor Serve the Law of the Authorities?/An Interview with Prosecutor
General Yuri Skuratov, FED. NEWS SvC.-KREMLIN PKG. (Dec. 1, 1995) < http://www. fnsg.com >.
213. This view was stated most forcefully to this author in an interview with Evgueni L. Reizman,
Counsel, DialogBank (Oct. 2, 1996). Mr. Reizman is a U.S.-trained Russian lawyer employed by
DialogBank (a Russian-American joint venture).
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than among other officials. Many judges genuinely seek to uphold the law.21 4 In
addition, judicial acts are scrutinized by the losing party, which limits how far
a corrupt judge can go to manipulate the outcome. 215 Appellate review is likely
to expose and to reverse any gross distortion of justice. Indeed, the right to a
de novo retrial before a three-judge appellate panel is specifically intended, in
part, as a check against corruption. 216 As observed by Veniamin Yakovlev, the
Chairman of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, it is "harder to [improperly] influence
three judges" than one.21 7
To put the courts' problems in perspective, it is useful to consider the following
statistics: Arbitrazh courts handled 208,081 cases in 1994,218 237,291 cases in
1995, and 290,094 cases in 1996.219 The commercial claims decided by the courts
in 1995 were valued at eighty trillion rubles (roughly $17 billion at 1995 exchange
rates) .22' During 1996, the courts considered claims valued at 185 trillion rubles
(approximately $37 billion) .221 This case volume suggests that the courts are
doing something right.
The leadership of the courts, as represented by Chairman Yakovlev and his
deputies, recognize that if Russia is to attract substantial foreign investment, its
courts must protect the legitimate interests of foreign companies. 22 The arbitrazh
courts do not yet have a substantial track record in cases involving foreign litigants.
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests foreign parties have fared well in cases
thus far decided.223 Western firms are experiencing particular success in litigating
214. Hendley, supra note 142, at 11 (noting that executives and in-house lawyers interviewed in
a study of 15 Russian manufacturing enterprises "generally viewed" arbitrazh judges as "impartial
in cases involving other firms"). The author participated in a home-stay exchange program in 1993
and 1994 with one of the deputy chairmen of the St. Petersburg arbitrazh court. The judge impressed
the author as an upright, erudite individual.
215. As noted in a recent article on Russian corporate law, "[a] corrupt judge can twist a 'reason-
ableness' standard to reach the decision he was paid to reach, but cannot so easily twist a requirement
that the company provide cumulative voting or appraisal rights. If the judge finds an exception on
some spurious ground, it will be obvious to all." Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing
Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1942 (1996).
216. Maslennikov, supra note 109, at 39.
217. Id.
218. 1995 Aribtrazh Court Statistics, supra note 171, at 102.
219. Id. at 104.
220. Report on Arbitration Court Prospects, supra note 158, at 36, 38.
221. Veniamin Yakovlev, Arbitration Court and a Market Ecomomy, RIA-NovosTI (May 7, 1997)
<http://www.ria-novosti.com/products/rein/1997/05/07-2-4.htm. >
222. Interview by Alexander Didusenko, with Arbitration Court Chief Yakovlev, NovoE VREMYA
(Feb. 6, 1995) translated in FBIS-SOV-95-042-5, Mar. 3, 1995, at 9; Yakovlev Press Briefing, supra
note 102.
223. See, e.g., Remarks of John Peters, Minister-Counselor for Commercial Affairs, U.S. Em-
bassy-Moscow, Conference on Opportunities in Russia at U.S. Embassy-Brussels (Jan. 23, 1997)
(observing that "the arbitration courts are improving, and we are seeing more and more rulings in
favor of foreign firms") (transcript on file with author); William Butler, You Started It. Did Not.
Did Too. Did Not, RUSSIA REV., July 29, 1996, at 29; Newton Davis, Commercial Litigation in
Russia: Getting a Fair Deal, 3 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L., 625, 633 (1996); Economist Intelligence
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against the tax authorities.224 Western companies have also successfully used the
arbitrazh courts to enforce intellectual property rights.225
Foreign parties may be winning actions in Russian courts because they are
forgoing litigation except in cases in which they are strongly favored.226 Yet,
even if Russian courts are used to enforce legal and contractual rights only in
relatively clear cases, the judicial system serves a more effective role than Western
accounts of the Russian legal system typically give it credit for.
V. Conclusion
"[Als a litigant," Judge Learned Hand once observed, "I should dread a
lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.' 227 Anyone
conducting business in Russia would do well to heed this advice.
Nevertheless, to borrow a phrase from the lead sentence of this article, a
Western party should not "forget. . . about getting justice in a Russian court."
The International Commercial Arbitration Court has earned international respect
as a credible arbitral forum. The general courts have established a track record
of recognizing arbitral awards in favor of foreign parties, including awards ren-
dered in other countries, and the arbitrazh courts are growing into their role as
specialized commercial courts. In appropriate circumstances, Western parties
can and should resort to Russian courts and arbitral institutions to vindicate their
rights.
Unit, Russia Politics: Court System Sheds Shabby Image, EIU ViewsWire (May 14, 1997), available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLEIU file; Telephone interview with Richard Steffens, U.S. Foreign
Commercial Service Officer, in Moscow (Oct. 8, 1996).
224. Jeremy Weinburg, Overcharged? Taking the Tax Man to Court, Moscow TIMES, April 8,
1997, at 4 (noting that "the major international accountancies report almost no setbacks in dozens
of [tax] cases in Moscow they have handled"); Matthew Kaminski, GE to Close Down Moscow
Subsidiary, FIN. TIMES, March 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3781497 (noting that "U.S. pharma-
ceuticals company Johnson & Johnson has won nine of the 10 cases it has brought against the tax
police"); Telephone interview with Michael Malloy, Counsel, Arthur Anderson, in Moscow (Oct.
2, 1996). For a discussion of arbitrazh court practice in tax cases, see 0. Boikov, Rassmotrennie
arbitrazhnymi sudami nalogovykh sporov [Examination of Tax Disputes by the Arbitrazh Courts],
Ross. luST., Nov. 1996, at 22.
225. See, e.g., Russia Steps Up Enforcement ofIntellectual Property Rights, 7 RUssIA & COMMON-
WEALTH Bus. L. REP., July 29, 1996; Astrid Wendlandt, Microsoft Hails Court Decision on Piracy,
Moscow TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996.
226. Even in U.S. courts, foreign parties appear to pick and choose cases for litigation very
carefully. A recent study of 94,142 cases concluded that in actions between an American and a
non-American, foreigners win 63 % of the time. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophi-
lia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (1996). According to the authors of the study,
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